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A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON
THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
FOREWORD
THE ROLE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT
Ronald D. Rotunda*
In The Federalist No. 78,1 Alexander Hamilton examined the ju-
dicial department. He relied on that branch to safeguard the limi-
tations drafted into the Constitution. While the judiciary is "in-
contestably" and "beyond comparison the weakest of the three
departments of power,"2 he conceded, nonetheless, the constitu-
tional limitations on legislative excess "can be preserved in prac-
tice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice;
whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the constitution void."'3
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law; B.A., 1967, Harvard; J.D., 1970,
Harvard University Law School.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (published under the name of Publius in
1788); see ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY, & JAMES MADISON, 2 THE FEDERALIST. A COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1937) (collecting the series, which
began appearing in the New York press on October 27, 1787). Hamilton wrote all of Publius
on the judiciary. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 312
(1971).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (cita-
tion omitted) (quoting de Montesquieu stating that: "Of the three powers above mentioned,
the judiciary is next to nothing.").
3. Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
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The legislators cannot be the constitutional judges of their own
powers, Hamilton argued to those whose support of the new Con-
stitution he sought.
It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to
be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits as-
signed to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the courts.4
If there is any "irreconcilable variance" between the Constitution
and a statute, "that which has the superior obligation and validity
ought of course to be preferred; or in other words, the constitution
ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to
the intention of their agents."' 5 Thus, "whenever a particular stat-
ute contravenes the constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial
tribunals to adhere to the latter, and disregard the former."'
Hamilton quickly anticipated - and as quickly dismissed -any
concern that a doctrine granting courts the right to declare legisla-
tive acts void would imply a "superiority of the judicial to the leg-
islative power."'7 The doctrine of judicial review only supposes that
the power of the people is superior to both the legislative and judi-
cial power because "where the will of the legislature declared in its
statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people declared in the
constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather
than the former."8
To those who would argue that the courts, "on the pretence of a
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitu-
tional intentions of the legislature,"9 Hamilton responded that
[t]his might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes;
or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single
statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they
should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the
4. Id. at 525 (emphasis added); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.").
5. Id. at 526.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 524.
8. Id. at 525.
9. Id. at 526.
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consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to
that of the legislative body.10
While Hamilton emphasized that the Constitution controlled
over ordinary legislation and that judges, who must interpret the
Constitution just as they interpret ordinary statutes, should only
follow the superior law of the Constitution, he never answered the
more difficult question: how carefully should the judiciary scruti-
nize legislation challenged as unconstitutional? What if judges ex-
ercise "will" rather than "judgment"? As Charles Evans Hughes
(who was to become Chief Justice in 1930) warned in 1907: "We
are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges
say it is.""
In Marbury v. Madison,'2 Chief Justice John Marshall, speaking
for the Court, for the first time actually invalidated an Act of Con-
gress. While he did not cite Hamilton's Federalist Papers No. 78,
he adopted much of Hamilton's reasoning. Marshall, however, un-
like Hamilton, emphasized the language of the Constitution, spe-
cifically the Supremacy Clause.13 In Marbury the Court invalidated
a congressional statute that was interpreted to expand the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, contrary to the way that the
Court interpreted Article III of the Constitution. In justifying judi-
cial review, Marshall gave the example of a person convicted of
treason under a statute that declares that only one witness is nec-
essary for conviction. 4
The Constitution clearly states that "[n]o Person shall be con-
victed of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
10. Id. (capitalization in the original). Hamilton concluded that because judges are the
"bulwarks of a limited Constitution," their need for independence argues strongly for the
life tenure that the Constitution guarantees. Id.
11. Charles Evans Hughes, Speech before Elmira Chamber of Commerce (1907), in AD-
DRESSES AND PAPERS 133, 139 (1908).
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. While the Supremacy Clause was central to Marshall's reasoning, Hamilton never
mentioned it. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. Murphy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179.
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same overt Act. . .... " In the hypothetical, the Constitution re-
quires a precise number of witnesses and the statute under review
just as clearly does not meet the precise number. Does Marshall's
example mean that he thought that the Court should only invali-
date legislation that is clearly in conflict with the Constitution?
Should - must - the Court, in case of doubt, defer to the legisla-
tive judgment?
Marshall, like Hamilton before him, did not focus on this ques-
tion, and few of their contemporaries probably expended much
thought about it. 6 But subsequent judges and commentators cer-
tainly have. The essays in this issue are in that tradition.
These later analysts of the Supreme Court, in studying its role in
the American polity, are also concerned with the conflict between
democracy and judicial review. In spite of Hamilton's assurances
that under judicial review the judges merely enforce the popular
will as expressed in the fundamental law of the Constitution, there
is no doubt that judicial review, in a very fundamental sense, is at
war with democratic rule. "Popular sovereignty suggests will; fun-
damental law suggests limit."' 7 To protect minority rights, the
Court cannot merely be a seismograph reflecting majority rule.
These two questions - how active should the Court be; to what
extent should judicial review conflict with democratic rule - are
very much related. The more active the Court is, the more it con-
flicts with majority rule.'8
Judge Learned Hand, for example, believed that the judicial
power to invalidate legislation was "not a lawless act" but was
hardly supported by the language of the Constitution, and that
therefore it should be used sparingly, only when necessary to pre-
vent the government from violating a clear and paramount consti-
tutional principle.' 9 Hand reasoned:
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, ci. 1 (emphasis added). The clause goes on to state that in
lieu of two witnesses a confession in open court is sufficient.
16. One of Hamilton's coauthors of the Federalist Papers, James Madison, thought that
the Supreme Court would only invalidate laws that clearly violated the Constitution. See
ROBERT G. MCCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 9 (1960).
17. Id. at 12 (emphasis in the original).
18. See Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of
Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992) ("For at
least the past generation, the countermajoritarian difficulty has transfixed constitutional
theorists.").
19. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14-29 (1958).
[Vol. 26:433
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[Slince this power is not a logical deduction from the structure of
the Constitution but only a practical condition upon its successful
operation, it need not be exercised whenever a court sees, or thinks
that it sees, an invasion of the Constitution.
20
Hand's argument for judicial self-restraint relies on the other
branches of government to fulfill their constitutional responsibil-
ity. He shared early concerns that too frequent a use of judicial
power atrophies the other organs of government. Judicial review is
"always attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of
legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus
lose the political experience, and moral education and the stimulus
that comes from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and
correcting their own errors."
2 1
Judicial activism, Professor Thayer warned, "dwarf[s] the politi-
cal capacity of the people, and ...deaden[s] its sense of moral
responsibility. '22 Professor Thayer, as Hand, would exercise review
only in the most extreme cases. A court can only disregard a law
subject to constitutional attack "when those who have the right to
make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very
clear one - so clear that it is not open to rational question. 23
In contrast, Professor Herbert Wechsler was satisfied that, be-
cause the framers intended to create the power of judicial review,
there is a greater constitutional role for the judiciary.24 Like Mar-
20. Id. at 15.
21. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106 (1901).
22. Id. at 107. For example, in 1935 President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged a congressman
to support a certain bill. His letter concluded: "I hope your committee will not permit
doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation." Let-
ter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, 32nd President of the United States, to Samuel B. Hill,
Member United States House of Representatives, D-Washington (July 6, 1935) (referring to
H.R. 8479, "A Bill to Stabilize the Bituminous Coal Mining Industry and Promote its Inter-
state Commerce"), in 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 297-
98 (1938), quoted in RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11-12 (3d ed.
1989).
23. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
The checking and cutting down of legislative power, by numerous detailed prohibi-
tions in the constitution, cannot be accomplished without making the government
petty and incompetent. This process has already been carried much too far in some of
our States. Under no system can the power of courts go far to save a people from
ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere.
Id. at 156.
24. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV, L.
REv. 1 (1959).
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shall, Wechsler relied on the language in the Constitution, the
Supremacy Clause, to justify the judicial role. Yet to assure that
judges should exercise "judgment" rather than "will," Wechsler ar-
gued that the judiciary should intervene against democratic laws
only when the judges could find a "neutral principle" that is inde-
pendent of the judges' view of the policies behind the law. Because
he believed that judicial review is "anchored in the Constitution,"
specifically in the Supremacy Clause, the obligation to exercise
that review cannot be attenuated.
25
Yet while Wechsler found a greater role for the judiciary than
Hand, he dissented vigorously "from those more numerous among
us who, vouching no philosophy to warranty, frankly or covertly
make the test of virtue in interpretation whether its result in the
immediate decision seems to hinder or advance the interests or the
values they support."26 If judges are result-oriented and let their
judgment turn on the immediate result before them, then courts
become "naked power organ[s]," and different judges, with differ-
ent sympathies, may properly reach different conclusions.2 7 Wechs-
ler elaborated:
[a]d hoc evaluation is, as it has always been, the deepest problem of
our constitutionalism, not only with respect to judgments of the
courts but also in the wider realm in which conflicting constitutional
positions have played a part in our politics.
Did not New England challenge the embargo that the South sup-
ported on the very ground on which the South was to resist New
England's demand for a protective tariff?. Was not Jefferson in the
Louisiana Purchase forced to rest on an expansive reading of the
clauses granting national authority of the very kind that he had
steadfastly opposed in his attacks upon the Bank?
[W]hether you are tolerant, perhaps more tolerant than I, of the
ad hoc in politics, with principle reduced to a manipulative tool, are
you not also ready to agree that something else is called for from the
courts? I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial pro-
cess is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with
respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analy-
sis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 11.
27. Id. at 12.
[Vol. 26:433
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achieved. To be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the
case they have before them. But must they not decide on grounds of
adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant
application but by others that the principles imply? Is it not the
very essence of judicial method to insist upon attending to such
other cases, preferably those involving an opposing interest, in eval-
uating any principle avowed?28
Just as Wechsler went further than Hand, so others go much
further than Wechsler and argue that judges should not at all be
hesitant to invalidate laws because judges have a unique role to
play as guardians of the Constitution.29 Some contend that this
very active form of review is justified only to protect individual
rights and liberties, rather than property and economic rights.
Thus the late Justice Douglas had long objected to the "school of
thought here that the less the judiciary does, the better."30 Doug-
las' view, he said, was well expressed by the late Edmond Cahn
who said that "we are entitled to reproach the majoritarian justices
of the Supreme Court . . . with straining to be reasonable when
they ought to be adamant. 3 1 Douglas believed the "judiciary was
an indispensable part of the operation of our federal system"
designed to play an important role "in guarding basic rights
against majoritarian control. '32
Other justices have actively used their judicial power but, unlike
Douglas, have not limited that activism to matters dealing with in-
dividual rights. For example, the conservative Justice McReynolds,
who supported the efforts of the Court to strike down a variety of
economic and social reform measures, 33 also authored Meyer v. Ne-
28. Id. at 12, 15. See generally, JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 1.4, 1.6 (4th ed. 1991).
29. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
30. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 110 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE (1958). See generally 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 23.2-.5 (forthcom-
ing 2d ed. 1992).
31. Flast, 392 U.S. at 110 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Edmond Cahn, Can the Su-
preme Court Defend Civil Liberties?, in TOWARD A BETTER AMERICA 132, 144 (Samuel ed.,
1968).
32. Flast, 392 U.S. at 111 (Douglas, J., concurring).
33. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act of 1935 held to be outside of federal commerce power); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936) (Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 held to violate Tenth Amendment);
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (Railroad Retirement Act of
1934 held to exceed congressional power); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (employ-
19921
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braska34 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5 two of the seminal deci-
sions in the area of civil liberties."
Meyer declared unconstitutional, under the due process clause, a
state law prohibiting the teaching of any subject to any person in
public or private schools in any language other than English. The
invalid statute also forbade teaching foreign language in grade
school. Meyer had been convicted of teaching the subject of read-
ing in the German language.
In Pierce a state law prohibited private and parochial schools.
McReynolds held that the law was invalid because the state unrea-
sonably interfered with the "liberty" of the parents and the "prop-
erty" of the schools.
McReynolds could impose his views regarding the unconstitu-
tionality of a minimum wage or a law prohibiting parochial schools
with consistency because, in his own words, "plainly, I think this
Court must have regard to the wisdom of the enactment. '37 Those
who have argued for judicial self-restraint are quick to point out
that the danger of an activism of a Douglas is that it can lead to,
and be used to justify, the activism of a McReynolds.
The two-century-old debate on the nature and extent of judicial
review is vividly illustrated by the judicial philosophies found in
the articles that follow. I am honored to be chosen to introduce
this Symposium, for it contains a thought-provoking collection of
essays from a diverse group of contributors. The authors include
Senators from both sides of the aisle, individuals who have liti-
gated before the Court, organization heads who are often responsi-
ble for affecting the diet of cases that the Supreme Court has - in
short, a group of people who can offer unique perspectives on the
role of the modern Court and the nature of the confirmation
process.
ment agency practice and rate regulation invalidated); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418
(1927) (theater ticket sales regulation invalidated); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S.
20 (1922) (tax on products of child labor invalidated as penalty); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918) (congressional law prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of
the products of child labor invalidated).
34. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
35. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
36. See Gary L. Bauer, A Social-Conservative Comment on the New Supreme Court, 26
U. RICH. L. REV. 497 (1992).
37. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 556 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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Senator Strom Thurmond begins with an essay celebrating the
vital role of the Supreme Court in our country. Based on the
twenty-three Supreme Court nominations that his thirty-seven
years in the Senate has witnessed, he comments on what the Sena-
tors should look for in a nominee."' Senator Leahy urges a broader
Senatorial role in the appointment process." Senator Grassley puts
in perspective the myriad types of important questions the Court
must decide every Term.40
Benjamin Hooks of the NAACP places the nomination process
in historical perspective and urges Senators "to probe deeply in
the views (in general terms) of nominees.""' Edward E. McAteer,
President of Religious Roundtable, urges a more restrained judici-
ary,42 while Professor Nadine Strossen, President of the American
Civil Liberties Union, urges the Court to be more active to protect
human rights.43 Donald E. Wildmon, President of the American
Family Association, and Benjamin W. Bull, General Counsel of the
American Family Law Center, continue the debate as they urge the
Court to adopt a more interpretive theory of judicial review. 44
Beverly LaHaye, President of Concerned Women for America,
emphasizes the importance of federalism and advocates that the
Court breathe new life into the Tenth Amendment.45 Thomas L.
Jipping, of the Free Congress Research and Education Foundation,
objects to "government by the judiciary."'46 In contrast, Arthur
Kropp, President of People for the American Way, criticizes the
Court for turning "its back on its traditional roles. '47
38. Strom Thurmond, The Supreme Court: Final Arbiter of Our Nation's Legal Dis-
putes, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 443 (1992).
39. Patrick J. Leahy, Advice and Consent: Ensuring Judicial Freedom, 26 U. RICH. L.
REv. 447 (1992).
40. Charles E. Grassley, The Role of the Supreme Court, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 449 (1992).
41. Benjamin L. Hooks, The Supreme Court as a Political Institution, 26 U. RICH. L.
REv. 451, 458 (1992).
42. Edward E. McAteer, In Defense of a Principled Judiciary, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 459
(1992).
43. Nadine Strossen, The Supreme Court's Role: Guarantor of Individual and Minority
Group Rights, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 467 (1992).
44. Donald E. Wildmon & Benjamin W. Bull, Conservative Supreme Court: Its Impact
on Traditional Values, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 471 (1992).
45. Beverly LaHaye & Ellen 0. Smith, The Supreme Court: New Hope for the Restora-
tion of Federalism, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 479 (1992).
46. Thomas L. Jipping, Judiciary: Know Thy Place, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 481 (1992).
47. Arthur J. Kropp, Reagan, Bush and the Supreme Court, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 495, 495
(1992).
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Gary L. Bauer, President of the Family Research Council, notes
that the Court is becoming more "conservative," but expresses
concern over some cases that are "plainly 'activist'" yet are "dear
to conservatives. '48 Meanwhile Anne Bryant of the American Asso-
ciation for University Women concludes that the Court is
"chip[ping] away at the rights of women and minorities. . ... -9
Our Supreme Court has become the most powerful judicial insti-
tution in the world today and is the envy of the newly emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe.5 It should not be surprising that
such a powerful Court has not escaped controversy. These essays
reflect that controversy. They strikingly disagree with each other,
and thus they illuminate and illustrate the present debate on the
role of the Court and the role of the confirmation process.
Will these essays help us predict the future for the Supreme
Court? Perhaps, but historically we have been very poor predictors
of long term trends. If the past teaches us anything, it should teach
us to be modest in gauging our ability to predict the future. In
1899, the Director of the U. S. Patent Office urged President Mc-
Kinley to abolish that Office because "[e]verything that can be in-
vented has been invented." Two years later, a discouraged Wilbur
Wright told his brother, Orville: "Man won't fly for a thousand
years." In 1912 Captain E.I. Smith of the Titanic confidently an-
nounced: "I cannot imagine any condition which would- cause this
ship to founder." And Admiral William Leahy warned President
Harry S Truman about the Atomic Bomb in 1945: "That is the
biggest fool thing we have ever done. The bomb will never go off,
and I speak as an expert in explosives."'"
48. Gary L. Bauer, A Social-Conservative Comment on the New Supreme Court, 26 U.
RICH. L. REV. 497, 497-98 (1992).
49. Anne Bryant, Balancing the Federal Judiciary, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 485, 485 (1992).
50. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Exporting the Bill of Rights: The Lesson From Romania,
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1065.
51. Arthur Zeikel, Forecasting Accuracy and the Stock Market, AMERICAN ASS'N OF INDI-
VIDUAL INVESTORS, Feb. 1992, at 17-18.
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